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Robert Batey*
The election of 1980 focused unprecedented attention on the discon-
tented voter. The presidential candidacies of John Anderson, Ed Clark
of the Libertarian Party, and Barry Commoner of the Citizen's Party
appealed directly to those unhappy with the choice offered by the two-
party system.1
While the presence on the ballot of an independent or third-party
candidate can provide the discontented with an alternative to not vot-
ing, this option is not frequently available. When it is not, the voter's
only affirmative way of expressing his discontent is to write on the bal-
lot the name of an individual who meets the qualifications for the office
involved, but who is hot a declared candidate. The right to cast such a
"write-in vote," and to have that vote counted, is the subject of this
article.
The implementation of electronic voting2 sparked recent legal in-
terest in write-in voting in Florida. First permitted in 1973,3 electronic
voting did not become a significant part of Florida's electoral system
until 1977, when the earlier legislation was overhauled.4 Also in 1977,
the Legislature systematically removed virtually every reference in the
election laws to write-in voting.5 Robert L. Shevin, then Florida's At-
* Associate Professor, Stetson University College of Law. B.A., Yale University,
1970; J.D., University of Virginia, 1974; LL.M., University of Illinois, 1976. The au-
thor, who was plaintiff and counsel pro se in the case discussed in the text at notes 34-
40 infra, wishes to thank the following Stetson law graduates for their assistance in the
preparation both of that lawsuit and of this article: Deborah A. Bushnell and Sara M.
Fotopulos. Of course, Ms. Bushnell and Ms. Fotopulos bear no responsibility for any of
the views expressed by the author.
1. See generally A. HADLEY, THE EMPTY POLLING BOOTH (1978).
2. See Electronic Voting Systems Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 101.5601-.5615 (1979).
3. Ch. 73-156, 1973 Fla. Laws 298.
4. Ch. 77-175, 1977 Fla. Laws 903.
5. See, e.g., id. § 66, repealing FLA. STAT. § 101.091 (1975) (providing in part
"nothing in this code [shall be] construed to prevent any elector, at any general elec-
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torney General, concluded that "[s]ince . . . there are no longer any
provisions in the election code for write-in ballots .... they have been
effectively prohibited."
One can only guess at the motivations of the 1977 legislators who
voted to prohibit write-in voting. One factor, however, may have been
the recognition that write-in voting complicates the electronic tabula-
tion of votes.7 Accordingly, a prohibition on write-in votes would facili-
tate the adoption of electronic voting.
This article describes methods of resisting the Florida Legisla-
ture's attempt to ban write-in voting. Part I explores the federal consti-
tutional challenge to such a ban. Part II considers the impact of the
Florida Constitution on the action of the 1977 Legislature. In the latter
context, the 1979 decision in Smith v. Smathers,8 which partially re-
vived the practice of write-in voting, will be discussed.
I
Although no specific language exists in the United States Consti-
tution guaranteeing the right to vote, this right has long been accorded
constitutional status.9 It can be argued persuasively that this right in-
cludes the right to cast a write-in vote.
tion, from voting at a general election for any qualified person other than those whose
names are printed on the ballot").
Interestingly, there was one oversight. Section 101.5606, which sets out the
requirements that an electronic voting system must meet, indicates that every such
system used in Florida must provide "a method for write-in voting." Id. § 101.5606
(1979). Perhaps this requirement was retained in order that the systems could be used
in municipal elections, in which the 1977 legislation permitted write-in voting. See note
6 infra.
6. Letter from Robert L. Shevin to Robert Batey, dated July 20, 1978 (on file
with the author). Attorney General Shevin added, however, "This action would not
prohibit the use of such voting in a municipal election unless said municipality adopted
the state election code." Id.
7. Tabulation by "data processing machines" is the essential feature of an elec-
tronic voting system. FLA. STAT. § 101.5602 (1979). Not only must write-in votes be
hand counted, but they also require close examination of the ballot cards in order to
prevent multiple voting.
8. 372 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1979).
9. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554-56 (1964) (collecting cases).
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ATo restrict a voter to only those candidates whose names appear on
the ballot arguably denies him any affirmative method of expressing his
dissatisfaction with the listed candidates. He faces one choice: he must
either select from a group of candidates, all of whom he deems un-
worthy, or not vote at all. In Socialist Labor Party v. Rhodes,10 a
three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio recognized that forcing such a choice on a voter is
constitutionally intolerable. Under then prevailing Ohio law, a voter
could cast a write-in ballot in a given election only if there were no
names on the ballot for that contest. Members of the Socialist Labor
Party and of the American Independent Party, unable to have the
names of their parties' presidential and vice-presidential nominees
placed on the official Ohio ballot, sought injunctive relief assuring that
they would at least be able to write in the names of their candidates. In
a per curiam opinion, the three-judge court ordered such relief:
Voters are often not content to vote for one of the candidates nominated
by the two major parties. A write-in ballot permits a voter to effectively
exercise his individual constitutionally protected franchise. . .. A blan-
ket prohibition against the use of the write-in ballots denies . . . quali-
fied electors. . . the right to freely participate in the electoral process as
guaranteed by the Constitution .... 11
The plaintiffs in Socialist Labor Party appealed because they
sought not just the right to write-in but also a place on the official
ballot for their respective nominees. The United States Supreme Court
granted this additional relief to the American Independent Party plain-
tiffs, but not to the Socialist Labor Party plaintiffs. In its opinion, the
Supreme Court did not address the write-in voting question because no
appeal had been taken from that portion of the three-judge panel's
opinion granting plaintiffs the right to write-in. 2
10. 290 F. Supp. 983 (S.D. Ohio 1968), aff'd in part and modified in part sub
nom. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). For a discussion of the case on appeal,
see text at notes 12 & 36-37 infra.
11. 290 F. Supp. at 987 (citation omitted).
12. 393 U.S. at 26. Other readings of the Supreme Court's opinion are possible.
See text at notes 36 & 37 infra.
5:1981
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Socialist Labor Party is one of only three reported cases that fully
considers the claim that there is a federal constitutional right to write-
in. The others are Thompson v. Willson,"3 a Georgia case, and Kamins
v. Board of Elections,4 a case arising in the District of Columbia.
As in Socialist Labor Party, the court in Thompson found that
the United States Constitution guarantees the voter "the right to write
the name of his choice and to strike the name presented to him. ... "I'
In voiding a statute that prohibited write-in voting, the Georgia Su-
preme Court wrote, "We have heard of similar methods of holding
elections in other so-called democratic countries . . .. but this is not
the American way .... ,,16
In Kamins, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals all but up-
held the federal constitutional claim asserted by the plaintiff. Faced
with a statute that allowed the counting of votes only for candidates
"whose name[s] appear on the general election ballot, ' 17 plaintiff ob-
jected, alleging a violation of the constitutional right to vote for an
otherwise qualified candidate whose name was not on the ballot. Quot-
ing extensively from Socialist Labor Party, the court construed the rel-
evant statutory language to permit write-in voting. 8 Considering the
plain language of the statute and the court's heavy reliance on Social-
ist Labor Party, the result in Kamins is tantamount to a holding that a
prohibition on write-in voting would be unconstitutional.
Numerous reported cases have dealt with the right to write-in as a
matter of state constitutional law. Indeed, Thompson held that the
statute struck down in that case violated both the United States and
the Georgia Constitutions.1 These state constitutional law holdings are
relevant to the federal constitutional question because few of these
cases rely on specific constitutional language regarding the right to
write-in; instead, the cases consider whether this right derives from the
general concept of a right to vote. Thus, these decisions are persuasive
authority for a similar interpretation of the federally guaranteed right
13. 223 Ga. 370, 155 S.E.2d 401 (1967).
14. 324 A.2d 187 (D.C. 1974).
15. 223 Ga. at -, 155 S.E.2d at 404.
16. Id.
17. D.C. CODE § 1-1110(a)(2) (1973).
18. 324 A.2d at 193-94.
19. 223 Ga. at -, 155 S.E.2d at 404.
4
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to vote.
Besides the Georgia Supreme Court, the highest courts in Colo-
rado,20 Florida,21 Iowa,22 and Maryland 23 have invalidated statutes
prohibiting write-ins on state constitutional grounds. Four courts have
reinterpreted statutes that appear to outlaw write-in voting, specifically
in order to save the enactments from violating state constitutional
law.24 Furthermore, several other courts have expressed in dicta that
their state constitutions guarantee the right to write-in.25
Of all the cases dealing with write-in voting as a matter of state
constitutional law, the most thorough discussion appears in Jackson v.
Norris, a 1937 decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals.26 In that
case, a voter sued to nullify a contract, executed by the Baltimore City
Voting Machine Board pursuant to statute, for the purchase of voting
machines that did not permit write-in voting. The trial court granted
the desired relief, and the court of appeals affirmed. The appellate
court emphatically determined that the right to vote included the right
to write-in: "An election is not free, nor does the elector enjoy a full
and fair opportunity to vote, if the right of suffrage is so restricted by
statute that he may not cast his ballot for such persons as are his
choice for the elective office." '27
Considering the argument that one vote is a trivial concern, the
court responded that it was "no minor matter":2 8
20. Littlejohn v. People ex reL. Desch, 52 Colo. 217, 121 P. 159 (1912).
21. Smith v. Smathers, 372 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1979); State ex reL. Lamar v. Dil-
lon, 32 Fla. 545, 14 So. 383 (1893). But see Pasco v. Heggen, 314 So. 2d 1 (Fla.
1975). For a detailed discussion of these cases, see text at notes 51-71 infra.
22. Barr v. Cardell, 173 Iowa 18, 155 N.W. 312 (1915).
23. Jackson v. Norris, 173 Md. 579, 195 A. 576 (1937).
24. Conn v. Isensee, 45 Cal. App. 531, 188 P. 279 (1920); Stewart v. Cart-
wright, 156 Ga. 192, 118 S.E. 859 (1923); Mayor v. State ex rel. Howie, 102 Miss.
663, 59 So. 873 (1912) (but see McKenzie v. Boykin, I11 Miss. 256, 71 So. 382
(1916)); Park v. Rives, 40 Utah 47, 119 P. 1034 (1911).
25. People ex rel. Hoyne v. McCormick, 261 Ill. 413, 103 N.E. 1053 (1914);
Cole v. Tucker, 164 Mass. 486, 41 N.E. 681 (1895); Westcott v. Scull, 87 N.J.L. 410,
96 A. 407 (1915); People ex rel. Bradley v. Shaw, 133 N.Y. 493, 31 N.E. 512, 19
N.Y.S. 302 (1892); Oughton v. Black, 212 Pa. 1, 61 A. 346 (1905); State ex rel.
Runge v. Anderson, 100 Wis. 523, 76 N.W. 482 (1898).
26. 173 Md. 579, 195 A. 576 (1937).
27. Id. at -, 195 A. at 586.
28. Id.
2051The Right To Write-In1 5:1981
5
Batey: Electoral Graffiti: The Right to Write-in
Published by NSUWorks, 1981
206 Nova Law Journal 5:1981
It must be considered in this connection that every voter has but a single
vote to cast. This vote, whether cast with the majority or the minority, is
as important in terms of personal value and constitutional significance as
every other vote. The futility of the elector's vote is not the measure of
his constitutional right. The civic and political importance of an un-
abridged and unhampered choice lie in the freedom of the elector to ex-
ercise fully this right on any occasion. .... 29
From this argument of a single votes insignificance, the court in
Jackson turned to a consideration of the would-be write-in voter's main
alternative: seeking a place on the official ballot for his candidate. But
this, according to the Maryland Court of Appeals, was not an
"equivalent . . . constitutional substitute. . . . [D]eprivation of [the
elector's] right to vote for his own choice is not compensated by the
privilege to make the costly, precarious, and laborious efforts to unite
"930the large group of voters . . . which would be necessary ....
Not all courts have followed this reasoning. 31 The contrary deci-
sions lack support for the conclusion that write-in voting may be pro-
hibited without abridging the right to vote; typically, there is only ref-
erence to the legislature's general power to regulate the conduct of
elections.3 2 Surveying these cases, one can conclude, as did the Mary-
land Court of Appeals in Jackson, that "[t]he decisions of [these]
states . . . are opposed by a preponderance of authority, and the
grounds on which they rest are not persuasive in view of the reasons
assigned in support of the majority view."33
29. Id. at_, 195 A. at 587.
30. Id. at _, 195 A. at 586.
31. Davidson v. Rhea, 221 Ark. 885, 256 S.W.2d 744 (1953) (5-2 decision);
Pasco v. Heggen, 314 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1975); State ex rel. Mize v. McElroy, 44 La. Ann.
796, 11 So. 133 (1892); McKenzie v. Boykin, 111 Miss. 256, 71 So. 382 (1916);
Mullholand v. Batt, 164 Ohio St. 362, 130 N.E.2d 805 (1955) (upholding the statute
declared unconstitutional in Socialist Labor Party v. Rhodes); Chamberlin v. Wood,
15 S.D. 216, 88 N.W. 109 (1901) (2-1 decision). For a discussion of Pasco v. Heggen,
see text at notes 56-65 infra. For a discussion of Socialist Labor Party v. Rhodes, see
text at notes 10-12 supra.
32. See, e.g., Davidson v. Rhea, 221 Ark. at -, 256 S.W.2d at 746, quoting
Chamberlin v. Woods, 15 S.D. at -, 88 N.W. at 111. Pasco v. Heggen, see note 31
supra, is not typical of such cases. Pasco develops a unique restriction on the right to
write-in and supports it with unique reasoning. See text at notes 56-65 infra.
33. 173 Md. at -, 195 A. at 588.
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The Right To Write-In
Examination of the cases dealing with the right to write-in reveals
substantial recognition of that right. No reported case explicitly dealing
with a federal constitutional argument questions the existence of such a
right. In addition, a preponderance of the cases considering a state con-
stitutional argument supports the proposition that the right to vote in-
cludes the right to cast a write-in ballot. Thus, there is considerable
force to the contention that the United States Constitution guarantees
the right to write-in.
B
In an unreported decision rendered in November of 1978, the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida rejected
this contention,3' finding no federal constitutional violation in Florida's
prohibition on write-in voting. The district court reached this conclu-
sion, which is of major significance in Florida, in two main steps.
First, the court considered the significance of Socialist Labor
Party v. Rhodes,35 the only other federal court decision directly on
point. The court considered the opinion of the three-judge panel in So-
cialist Labor Party undercut by the action taken by the United States
Supreme Court on appeal.
The plaintiffs in Socialist Labor Party sought either a place on the
ballot for their candidates or the right to write-in those candidates'
names. The three-judge panel considered each of these claims sepa-
rately. According to the Florida federal court, however, "[T]he Su-
preme Court's analysis . . . took a different approach. There was no
discussion of the right to vote as a matter completely distinct from bal-
lot access." 36 Rather, continued the district court, the reasoning of the
Supreme Court implied that "the right to vote is intimately related to
the right of access to the ballot (indeed, The Supreme Court has ...
stated [in another case] that the rights of voters to vote and of candi-
dates to ballot access are 'intertwined.') ' 37 Thus, the Florida federal
court concluded that the constitutional status of the right to write-in
could not be judged without reference to those constitutional decisions
34. Batey v. Krivanek, No. 78-815 (M.D. Fla., Nov. 22, 1978) (Krentzman, J.).
35. See text at notes 10-12 supra.
36. No. 78-815, slip op. at 5.
37. Id. (quoting Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 715 (1974)).
20711 5:1981
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concerning a candidate's right of access to the ballot. Because the lower
court's decision in Socialist Labor Party had not done this, the district
court reasoned that case's holding was questionable.
This reasoning foreshadowed the second step in the federal district
court's analysis: examination of the ballot access cases. The district
court emphasized the recognized right of a state to "keep its ballots
within manageable, reasonable limits"3 8 by "limiting places on the bal-
lot to those who can demonstrate substantial popular support."3 9 Then
the court related these holdings to the "intertwined" right to vote. The
court wrote: "If the number of places on the ballot can be so limited, it
follows that there cannot simultaneously exist an unrestricted right to
cast write-in votes for whomever the voter thinks should be a
candidate."'40
This sentence forms the crux of the district court's opinion, and its
logic is quite simple. The state's power to keep a candidate's name off
the official ballot necessarily includes the power to prevent individual
voters from adding that name to their ballots. While simple, this logic
is not unassailable. Indeed, both steps in the district court's analysis
invite criticism.
The federal court erred in its reading of the action taken by the
Supreme Court in Socialist Labor Party. First, the district court failed
to consider the fact that the defendants in Socialist Labor Party did
not appeal.41 Thus, the only issue properly before the Supreme Court
was the three-judge panel's refusal to place plaintiffs' candidates on the
official ballot. Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court did not view the
right to vote as a matter separate from ballot access.
Nonetheless, considerable authority does exist to support the pro-
position that the rights to vote and to ballot access are intertwined. But
attentive reading of the ballot access cases shows that they are not as
38. Id. at 6, (citing Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972)).
39. Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)).
40. Id.
41. This oversight is understandable because both parties to the Florida lawsuit
also overlooked this fact in the memoranda they filed with the district court. See, e.g.,
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Batey v.
Krivanek, No. 78-815, slip op. at 2-3 (M.D. Fla., filed Sept. 28, 1978) (arguing errone-
ously that the Supreme Court had affirmed the write-in holding of the three-judge
panel).
8
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closely interrelated as the district court found.
A state may, under certain circumstances, deny a candidate a
place on its official ballot without violating the federal constitution.42
But the state interest that is served by such a limitation is the desire to
keep "ballots within manageable, understandable limits.1 43 The con-
cern is that " 'laundry list' ballots [will] discourage voter participation
and confuse and frustrate those who do participate. . . ."" Seen in
this light, a limit on ballot access does not conflict with the right to
write-in. Allowing write-in votes does not expand the ballot (except to
add a blank space under each office), nor does it confound or deter the
would-be voter. Thus, the ballot access cases do not implicitly deny the
right to write-in.
In fact, the ballot access cases provide arguments supporting the
right to write-in, rather than reasons for denying that right. The
United States Supreme Court has frequently cited the fact that a state
permits write-in votes as a reason for allowing that state to limit a can-
didate's access to the ballot. In Jenness v. Fortson,'4 5 the Court upheld
a set of Georgia laws keeping off the ballot any minor-party or inde-
pendent candidate who could not garner the signatures of five percent
of the voters in the previous general election. In approving these laws,
the Court noted:
[T]hese procedures relate only to the right to have the name of a candi-
date or the nominee of a "political body" printed on the ballot. There is
no limitation whatever, procedural or substantive, on the right of a voter
to write in on the ballot the name of the candidate of his choice and to
have that write-in vote counted.46
Therefore, the fact that a voter could write in the name of a candidate
denied ballot access was one reason for allowing the state to limit that
access. Similar reliance on the availability of write-in votes is found in
Storer v. Brown, 7 and in American Party v. White,'8 companion cases
42. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
43. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 715 (1974) (emphasis added).
44. Id.
45. 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
46. Id. at 434.
47. 415 U.S. 724, 736 n.7 (1974) (upholding California's requirement that
5:1981
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applying the ballot access principles of Jenness. Considering Jenness,
Storer, and American Party, one court has concluded that they lend
credence to the argument that there is a federal constitutional right to
write-in .4
Contrary to the reasoning of the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida, the ballot access cases decided by the
Supreme Court do not necessitate denial of the existence of a constitu-
tional right to write in. This right and the right to a place on the ballot
are not that closely intertwined. Rather, the rights are complamentary.
The Supreme Court's cases imply that, because a state may limit one
of these political rights, access to the ballot, it must honor the other the
right to cast a write-in vote.
II
The case for write-in voting draws support not only from the
United States Constitution, but also from the constitutions of the sev-
eral states.50 In Florida, the status of write-in voting as a matter of
state constitutional law has developed in a decidedly distinctive fashion.
With respect to this issue, no other state's constitutional documents
have been interpreted as Florida's have. Almost a century of Florida
jurisprudence has produced this result: there is a state constitutional
right to cast a write-in vote, but only if the vote is cast for someone
who has "qualified" as a write-in candidate.
This interpretation of the Florida Constitution, while better than a
denial of the right to write-in, is unsatisfactory on many counts. The
Florida Supreme Court should abandon this interpretation, replacing it
with a broader recognition of the right to cast a write-in vote.
minor-party and independent candidates have been disaffiliated from the major parties
for at least a year).
48. 415 U.S. 767, 772 n.3 (1974) (upholding Texas's requirement that minor-
party and independent candidates show substantial support through either previous bal-
loting, nominating conventions, or petitions).
49. Kamins v. Board of Elections, 324 A.2d 187, 193 n. 11 (D.C. 1974).
50. See text at notes 19-25 supra.
10
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The right to write-in was first found in the state constitution in
1893. In State ex rel. Lamar v. Dillon,5" the state attorney general
brought a quo warranto action against thirteen councilmen of the city
of Jacksonville. Attorney General Lamar contended that the council-
men had been elected pursuant to an unconstitutional statute and,
therefore, had unlawfully usurped the offices of their predecessors.
Among the allegedly unconstitutional features of the statute was a pro-
hibition on write-n voting in the Jacksonville election.52
While rejecting the rest of the attorney general's challenges to the
election statute, the Florida Supreme Court agreed that the ban on
write-in voting violated the state constitution's pledge that "in all elec-
tions by the people, the vote shall be by ballot."5' 3 Construing this gen-
eral recognition of the right to vote, the court held:." [T] he legislature
cannot, in our judgment, restrict an elector to voting for some one of
the candidates whose names have been printed upon the official ballot.
He must be left free to vote for whom he pleases. . . ." After finding
one portion of the statute unconstitutional, the state supreme court
went on to uphold the challenged election, because there was no allega-
tion by the attorney general that any Jacksonville voter had wanted to
cast a write-in vote.55
The broad language of this 1893 decision, recognizing a right to
vote as one "pleases," remained an unchallenged facet of Florida's
jurisprudence for more than eighty years. For this reason, the plaintiffs
in Pasco v. Heggen,56 a 1975 decision of the state supreme court, must
have been surprised to find that court undercutting its previous
position.
51. 32 Fla. 545, 14 So. 383 (1893).
52. There was no explicit prohibition; however, the state supreme court con-
cluded that "the only fair and reasonable construction [of the statute] restrict[s] the
voter to a choice of candidates printed on the ballot." Id. at 582, 14 So. at 394.
53. This provision appeared in article VI, section 6, of the 1885 Constitution.
54. 32 Fla. at 579, 14 So. at 393-94. This language echoes an earlier decision,
State v. Anderson, 26 Fla. 240, 8 So. 1 (1890): "The distinguishing theory of the ballot
system is that every voter shall be permitted to vote for whom he pleases. Id. at
259, 8 So. at 5, quoted at 32 Fla. at 579, 14 So. at 393.
55. 32 Fla. at 585-86, 14 So. at 396.
56. 314 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1975).
I
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Plaintiffs Pasco and Perkins wanted to cast write-in votes in a Tal-
lahassee city commission election. They were prevented from doing so
by the combined effect of two state statutes: one prescribing the means
by which a person may qualify as a write-in candidate, and another
providing a space on the ballot for write-in votes only when a write-in
candidate has qualified.57 Because no one had registered as a write-in
candidate for the Office of Tallahassee City Commissioner, Group 1,58
Pasco and Perkins were not allowed to write in any name for the office.
Their lawsuit claimed that the operation of these two statutes violated
the right to vote guaranteed them by the state constitution. Despite the
broad language of State ex rel. Lamar v. Dillon, the Florida Supreme
Court disagreed, upholding the statutes in question.
The court, in an opinion written by Justice Ben Overton, cited Dil-
lon with approval,59 but then indicated two major reasons why the
challenged statutes did not offend the principle enunciated in that case.
First was the need "to protect the integrity of [the] political process
from frivolous or fraudulent candidacy."60 Requiring write-in candi-
dates to register prior to an election 6 1 and prohibiting write-in votes
unless someone does register are constitutionally permissible means of
guarding against the last-minute candidate and the nonexistent one.
The second reason offered by the supreme court was the need "to
protect the right of privacy for the individual who does not desire to be
a candidate."62 A decade before Pasco, the state supreme court had
held in Battaglia v. Adams 5 that an individual had a legal right to
keep his name off the official election ballot.6 4 According to Justice
57. Both statutes have since been revised to omit all reference to write-in voting.
Ch. 77-175, §§ 16 & 66, 1977 Fla. Laws 903, amending FLA. STAT. §§ 99.023,
101.251 (1975). But see Smith v. Smathers, 372 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1979) (reviving FLA.
STAT. § 99.023 (1975)). For a discussion of Smith v. Smathers, see text at notes 67-71
infra.
58. Under the qualification statute, FLA. STAT. § 99.023 (1975), a write-in can-
didate must file a notice of his candidacy forty-five days prior to the election.
59. 314 So. 2d at 3.
60. Id.
61. See note 58 supra.
62. 314 So. 2d at 3.
63. 164 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1964). For a further discussion of Battaglia, see text at
notes 82-91 infra.
64. But see Yorty v. Stone, 259 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1972). For a discu-ision of
1212
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Overton, the right not to be on the ballot was equivalent to a right not
to be voted for, and this second right applied whether or not the indi-
vidual's name appeared on the official ballot.6 5
Pasco undoubtedly emboldened those in the state legislature who
wanted to do away with write-in voting entirely. Within two years, even
the limited form of write-in voting upheld in Pasco was gone; in 1977
the Legislature repealed the statutes at issue in that case, leaving no
provision for write-in votes in the election code.6
In the first general election following this repeal, Lee Smith, a mi-
nor party candidate for the United States House of Representatives,
sought to become a write-in candidate when he failed to meet Florida's
requirements for ballot access. When informed that write-in votes
would not be allowed in the general election, Smith brought suit, claim-
ing a violation of his state constitutional rights. In Smith v.
Smathers,67 the Florida Supreme Court agreed that Smith's rights had
been abridged.
Justice Overton's opinion in Smith adhered closely to the reason-
ing he used for the court in Pasco. Once again, the court cited with
approval State ex rel. Lamar v. Dillon.68 The Smith opinion under-
scored the importance of Dillon by establishing the similarity of the
constitutional provisions at issue in both cases. 9 Because the concerns
mentioned in Pasco are absent when there is an active write-in candi-
date (the candidate exists, he must be considered serious, and he has
waived any privacy right), the principle enunciated in Dillon con-
trolled, and Smith's constitutional claim was upheld.70
Yorty, see text at notes 82-91 infra.
65. A third reason, the need to keep "ballots within manageable limits," was also
mentioned. 314 So. 2d at 3. For a critique of another court's use of the same argument,
see text at notes 42-44 supra.
66. See text at notes 5-6 supra.
67. 372 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1979).
68. Id. at 429.
69. Id. at 429 & n.2. Article VI, section 1, of the 1068 constitution provides:
"All elections by the people shall be by direct and secret vote." In dissent, Justice
Alderman argued that the omission from the 1968 constitution of the word "ballot,"
which appeared in the 1885 constitution, see text at note 53 supra, rendered Dillon
irrelevant to the constitutional issue in Smith v. Smathers. Id. at 430-31 (Alderman,
J., dissenting).
70. Nevertheless, Smith was denied the relief he sought. Because of the brief
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The supreme court's solution to the problem posed by this finding
of unconstitutionality was novel. The court declared certain of the re-
pealed statutes relating to write-in voting "revived," to "remain in
force and effect . . . until properly changed by the legislature. 7 1 In
other words, the court made part of the statutory scheme upheld in
Pasco unrepealable.
The Florida Supreme Court has thus recognized only a limited
right to write-in. If there exists a qualified write-in candidate seeking
write-in votes, there is a right to cast a vote for such a person, even
though his name does not appear on the official ballot. But if no such
candidate exists, there is no right to write-in.
B
Florida's limited recognition of a state constitutional right to cast
a write-in vote should no longer be followed. In an appropriate case,
the Florida Supreme Court should overrule its decision in Pasco and
return to the more expansive right to write-in recognized in Dillon.72
The limited right now accorded Florida citizens does not give full scope
to the right to vote, nor is the limitation necessary to support the two
goals mentioned in Pasco .7
Florida's limited right to write-in fails to give adequate scope to
the right to vote. The rights of the potential write-in voter are contin-
gent upon the actions of another, the would-be write-in candidate. This
places the candidate in a position superior to the voter, violating the
cardinal principle of Dillon that the voter "must be left free to vote for
time period between the filing of the lawsuit and the general election, the state supreme
court denied Smith's application for a writ of mandamus. See 372 So. 2d at 428. The
court's declaration that Smith's rights had been violated came months after the
election.
71. Id. at 429. The revived provisions are FLA. STAT. §§ 99.023, 101.011(2),
101.151(5)(a), (b) (1975), which were amended by Ch. 77-175, 1977 Fla. Laws 903.
Section 99.023 deals with the qualification of write-in candidates, see note 58 supra,
while §§ 101.151(5) and 101.011(2) concern the preparation and marking of official
ballots, respectively.
72. These steps would necessarily undercut the language in Smith v. Smathers
restricting its holding to situations in which there is a qualified write-in candidate.
73. See text at notes 59-65 supra.
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whom he pleases."74 Furthermore, Florida's current conception of the
constitutional right to write-in suggests that the process for qualifying a
write-in candidate somehow provides an adequate substitute for writing
in the person most qualified, whether a candidate or not. But the pro-
cess is burdensome, requiring persuasion of the desired candidate sub-
stantially in advance of the election.7 5 The court in Jackson v. Norris,76
an influential decision regarding write-in voting, held that such substi-
tutes cannot justify abridging the right to vote for any qualified person,
on the ballot or off."7 The Florida Supreme Court would do well to
adopt the expansive concept of the right to vote recognized by the
Maryland courts in Jackson.
Pasco v. Heggen cited the need to maintain the integrity of the
election ,process as a reason for recognizing only a limited right to
write-in. 8 While it is appropriate to be concerned about a "frivolous or
fraudulent candidacy, '7 this concern does not provide an adequate
reason for restricting write-in voting. Some thirty-eight jurisdictions
manage to maintain the integrity of their electoral process while per-
mitting virtually unrestricted write-in voting.80 The number of states
74. 32 Fla. at 579, 14 So. at 394 (emphasis added). See text at note 54 supra.
75. See note 58 supra.
76. 173 Md. 579, 195 A. 576 (1937). See text at notes 26-30 supra.
77. Id. at _, 195 A. at 586. See text at note 30 supra.
78. See text at note 60 supra.
79. 314 So. 2d at 3.
80. ALA. CODE § 17-8-5 (1977); ALASKA STAT. § 15.15.030 (1976); ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 16-844 (1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-309 (Supp. 1977); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 15, § 4502 (Supp. 1970); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1110 (Supp. 1978), construed
in Kamins v. Board of Elections, 324 A.2d 187 (D.C. 1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-
1224 (1980); IDAHO CODE § 34-906 (Supp. 1980); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 24A-7
(Supp. 1978); IowA CODE § 49.31 (Supp. 1978); KAN. STAr. ANN. §§ 25-616, 25-617
(Supp. 1979); Ky. REV. STAT. § 117.265 (Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 702 (1965); MD. ELEC. CODE ANN., art. 33, § 14-1 (1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 54, § 42 (West 1980); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 168.737 (1967); MINN. STAT.
§ 203A.12 (Supp. 1978); Mo. REV. STAT. § 115.439.1 (Supp. 1978); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 13-12-208 (1980); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-428 (1978); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 59:58 (1970); N.J. REV. STAT. § 19:15-28 (1964); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-8-36
(1978); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 7-106 (McKinney 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-151
(Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16-12-06 (1971); OR. REV. STAT. § 254.145 (1979);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 3063 (Purdon 1980-1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-19-31
(1969); S.C. CODE § 7-13-1380 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-7-117 (1979); *UTAH
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allowing such voting suggests that the practical problems posed by
write-in votes are far from insurmountable; a state can find ways of
resolving these problems without restricting the scope of the right to
vote." '
A potentially more compelling reason for limiting the right to
write-in is mentioned in Pasco: the need to protect the privacy rights of
the person for whom the write-in vote is cast. 2 On close examination,
however, this reason loses its appeal. Being the recipient of a write-in
vote is a negligible intrusion on privacy, one which does not justify a
limitation on write-in voting.
In Battaglia v. Adams,83 the state supreme court held that putting
Richard Nixon's name on the 1964 Republican presidential primary
ballot over his objection violated Nixon's right to privacy." In Pasco,
the court cited Battaglia in holding that a person has a privacy interest
in not receiving a write-in vote."5 While case law in another jurisdiction
does support the idea that including a person's name on the official
election ballot can violate his right of privacy,8 6 the dictum in Pasco
extending this reasoning to write-in voting is unprecedented. The "in-
trusion" upon privacy occurring when one is the recipient of a write-in
vote seems much too slight to meet the threshold requirement of pri-
vacy law that the intrusion be "highly offensive to a reasonable per-
son."87 Furthermore, the risk of such an intrusion could justly be
characterized as part of the price we each pay for our system of free
elections.
CODE ANN. § 20-7-20 (Supp. 1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2472 (Supp. 1980); VA.
CODE § 24.1-129 (1980); WASH. REV. CODE § 29.51.170 (Supp. 1977); W. VA. CODE
§ 3-4-8 (1979); Wis. STAT. § 7.50 (1967); WYO. STAT. § 22-10-101 (1977).
81. For example, the Oregon Legislature was concerned about the campaign ex-
penditures of write-in candidates. Rather than requiring such candidates to file expen-
diture statements prior to the election and prohibiting write-in votes for candidates who
did not file, Oregon provided that no write-in candidate who won would be deemed
elected until he had filed a campaign expenditure statement. OR. REV. STAT. § 260.245
(1977). Accord, WYO. STAT. § 22-16-120 (1977).
82. See text at notes 62-65 supra.
83. 164 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1964).
84. Id. at 197 (following Op. ATr'Y GEN. FLA. 060-171 (1960)).
85. 314 So. 2d at 3-4.
86. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 812 & n.12 (4th ed. 1971).
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).
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The Florida Supreme Court recognized as much in a related con-
text. In Yorty v. Stone,88 a presidential candidate who wanted to com-
pete in some states' primaries, but not Florida's, sought to remove his
name from the Florida presidential primary ballot. In 1972, candidate
Sam Yorty relied on 1964 noncandidate Richard Nixon's success in
obtaining similar relief in Battaglia v. Adams. The state supreme court
distinguished Battaglia because Yorty (unlike Nixon in 1964) re-
mained an announced candidate. His interest in privacy was thus less-
ened,89 and this reduced interest was outweighed by the public interest:
"A matter of such magnitude as the selection of the best possible can-
didate for the highest position in this nation should be controlled by the
public's right to a complete expression of their views and not by the
individual's personal and tactical choices .... ",0
Just as the public's right to express its views through voting out-
weighed Yorty's privacy interest in keeping his name off the primary
ballot, so the public's right to vote should outweigh the far smaller pri-
vacy interest of the citizen who desires not to receive any write-in
votes.91 In deciding Pasco v. Heggen, the Florida Supreme Court
should have given as much attention to Yorty as it gave to Battaglia.
The result would have been a less limited concept of write-in voting.
C
The reasons offered for limiting the state constitutional right to
cast a write-in ballot are not compelling, and the Florida Supreme
Court should abandon its limited conception of that right. Further-
more, even for those who consider the proffered reasons sufficient to
justify some limitation on the right to write-in, there is no reason to go
as far as the supreme court has gone. The goals of maintaining the
integrity of elections and preserving personal privacy can be attained
by permitting the disgruntled voter to cast a ballot for "None of the
88. 259 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1972).
89. Id. at 147-48.
90. Id. at 149.
91. This balancing is analogous to that performed by the United States Supreme
Court when weighing privacy rights against freedom of speech and of the press. See,
e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (recognizing freedom-of-
expression limitations on the law of libel).
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above."
None-of-the-above voting is currently allowed in general elections
only in Nevada.9 2 If adopted in Florida, none-of-the-above voting could
operate in this fashion: under each office listed on the official ballot
would be the names of the qualified candidate or candidates, plus a slot
marked "None of the above." Votes for "None of the above" would be
tallied just like votes for a candidate. "None of the above" could win
an election or earn a place in a runoff. If "None of the above" did win,
the office would become vacant, to be filled as any office vacated by
death or resignation would be.93
None-of-the-above voting poses none of the problems seen in write-
in voting. There is no threat to the integrity of the electoral system
through fraudulent or frivolous candidates, nor is anyone's right of pri-
vacy breached. If the Florida Supreme Court must allow some limita-
tion on write-in voting, substituting none-of-the-above voting would be
the limitation least violative of the right to vote. If the court will not
recognize an unlimited right to cast a write-in ballot, it should recog-
nize a state constitutional right to cast a "None of the above" vote.94
III
The discontented voter has a right to affirmatively express his dis-
appointment with the elective choices offered him. A right to write-in
derives from the federal Constitution and should be recognized by the
federal courts. Dissatisfied Florida voters may also rely on the state
constitution, which should be interpreted as granting an unrestricted
right to write-in (or at least as recognizing a right to cast a "none-of-
92. NEv. REv. STAT. § 293.269 (1979). The provision applies only to statewide
contests, however, and none-of-the-above votes do not affect the outcome of these con-
tests. Id.
93. See W. ADAMS, A SUGGESTED NEW ARTICLE ON ELECTIONS 11 (August,
1977) (testimony before the Florida Constitutional Revision Commission): the state
constitution should "guarantee the right of every voter to cast a negative vote [and] the
right to have the vote counted with the same dignity as votes for candidates."
94. Some may object that there is no basis for reading such a requirement into
the state constitution. While the point is well-taken, the court's action in so reading the
constitution would be no more extreme than its holding that the state constitution
makes certain election statutes dealing with write-in voting unrepealable. See text at
note 71 supra.
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the-above" vote). Without some judicial action of the sort advocated,
the right to vote will most often be meaningful only for those pleased
with the choices offered by the two-party system, a group whose num-
ber grows smaller with every passing day.
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